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Abstract  
Whether raising the price of addictive goods can reduce its burden is widely debated in many 
countries, largely due to lack of appropriate data and robust methods. Three key concerns 
frequently raised in the literature are: unobserved heterogeneity; omitted variables; 
identification problem. Addressing these concerns, using robust instrument and employing 
unique individual-level panel data from Indian Punjab, this paper investigates two related 
propositions (i) will increase in alcohol price reduce its burden (ii) since greater incomes raise 
the costs of inebriation, will higher incomes affect consumption of alcohol negatively. Distinct 
from previous studies, the key variable of interest is the budget share of alcohol that allows 
studying the burden of alcohol consumption on drinker’s and also on other family members. 
Results presented show that an increase in alcohol price is likely to be regressive, especially on 
the bottom quartile, with a rise in the budget share of alcohol given budget constraint. This 
outcome is robust to different econometric specifications. Preliminary explorations suggest that 
higher per capita income increases the odds of quitting drinking. Results reported have wider 
implications for the effective design of addiction related health policies. 
Keywords: Alcohol; Price; India; Econometrics; Sobriety 
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1. Introduction 
    Since the theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), in nearly every country, 
taxes on addictive goods are imposed to regulate its consumption (WHO, 2014). Yet, tobacco 
worldwide continues to kill nearly 6 million each year and alcohol related illnesses are cause 
for 3.3 million deaths globally in the year 2012 alone (WHO, 2014). From this evidence, it is 
unclear if the key prediction holds good of the most economic models of addiction, including 
the widely accepted rational addiction model pioneered by Becker and Murphy (1988) – that 
is, a higher price of the addictive good (due perhaps to a larger tax) reduces its burden in both 
the short and long run. 
    In this paper, we examine whether raising the price of alcohol can reduce its burden on 
drinkers and their families. This study uses individual level panel data from carefully designed 
and implemented several rounds of individual and household surveys in the Indian state of 
Punjab. More specifically, we use the longitudinal surveys among randomly selected sample 
of 895 alcohol drinkers and non-drinkers in the year 2008, and followed for six years tracking 
their alcohol drinking behaviour. During this period, three surveys each with a gap of two years 
were implemented to collect both individual and household information. Using the panel data, 
we implement fixed effect regressions to examine the impact of alcohol price policy on 
household burden. Results show that an increase in alcohol price is likely to be regressive, 
especially on the bottom quartile, with a rise in the budget share of alcohol given budget 
constraint. Our results are robust to different model specifications. 
    A number of recent studies have examined different models of alcohol addiction using data 
on price paid and quantity consumed of alcohol (price-quantity relationship) from both 
developed and developing countries, applying a range of econometric methods. Yet, these 
studies suffer from concerns related to lack of appropriate data and robust methods. Addressing 
these concerns our paper makes three novel contributions to existing literature. First, studies 
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typically specify the price-quantity demand relationship to estimate the own-price elasticity for 
alcohol (Grossman et al. 1998; Baltagi and Griffin 2002; Shrestha 2015). However, the 
estimated parameter do not satisfy the restriction imposed (budget constraint that limits total 
expenditure) on them by demand theory (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). Distinct from previous 
studies, our key variable of interest is the budget share of alcohol, which allows studying the 
household burden of alcohol consumption, not just on drinkers. Unlike quantity of alcohol 
consumed, the advantage of using alcohol budget shares is that it satisfies the budget constraint 
limiting household total expenditure. 
    Second, the identification of the demand equation from supply is difficult in existing studies. 
Recent studies estimating the price-quantity demand for alcohol relationship employ a range 
of econometric models. For instance, Manning et al. (1995) estimate quantile regressions, 
Ayyagari et al. (2013) use finite mixture model, while Shrestha (2015) estimates both two-part 
and finite mixture model on individual panel data. Although novel in some respect, these 
studies do not address the identification concerns. Some other studies however have tried to 
address the identification concern with instrumental variables, yet the instrument used by these 
studies did not uniquely shift supply without affecting demand (Bopp, 1983; Baruch and 
Kannai, 2011).  
    We address the identification problem, which is our primary focus and the main contribution 
to the literature, using the price of key input that strongly affect supply but not demand. We 
identify the price of the key ingredient gur as an important predictor of the price of alcohol. 
Detailed information was collected during field surveys on all the inputs used in the production 
of country liquor. One key ingredient in the production is gur (jaggry), which is purchased 
entirely from outside the village. The price of gur is a major determinant of supply of alcohol, 
and a potential predictor of the price of alcohol. Given that it is unlikely to affect the demand 
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for alcohol significantly, price of gur appears to be a reasonably good instrument for the price 
of alcohol. 
    Third, most existing data sets on alcohol consumption for developed countries are collected 
through telephone interviews or mail surveys with little reliability checks (Grossman et al. 
1998; Shield and Rehm 2012), while for developing countries they are collected as part of 
household consumption data, often with no information on who within the household drinks 
(McKenzie, 2002; John, 2008; Guindon et al, 2011; Jumrani and Birthal, 2017). Generally, 
households have only one or two drinkers, so any estimates based on this data are biased 
downwards showing lower consumption, although money spent on consumption of this good 
is much higher. Since poor households tend to have larger family size, the downward bias is 
much higher and serious. Besides, aggregate-level demand estimates for alcohol will 
mismeasure individual-level price responsiveness. The individual-level panel data contains 
both individual consumption and purchase price of alcohol within the same database, providing 
consistency across information. 
    Finally, results from this paper have the potential to inform alcohol policy in India. Different 
states in India have followed various policy options, ranging from prohibition (Gujarat, Bihar 
and Nagaland) to government provision (Tamil Nadu), and private provision (Delhi) of alcohol. 
Besides, higher tax rates to regulate production and consumption of alcohol have also been 
imposed (Saldanha 1995). Despite these policies, per capita consumption of alcohol by adults 
in recent years have increased by 115 percent (Rahman 2002). Given that higher taxes are likely 
to be regressive, prohibition may be an attractive policy for India. However, enforcement and 
unintended consequences such as crime and corruption may pose a greater challenge (Thornton 
1991). An income policy with the potential to increase the cost of inebriation such as cash 
transfer programs or employment programs could perhaps enhance the welfare of poor 
households. 
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2. Methods 
2.1. Study design and data sources 
    Data used in this study is based on the initial survey conducted by the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi with selection of households in the 
respective villages based on stratified random sampling. Subsequent surveys were 
implemented in collaboration with the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), 
henceforth; we will refer to the data as NCAER-ISEC panel data set.  Historically, the district 
of Patiala in the Indian Punjab is known for its extravagant military culture and strong “pegs 
of whiskey”, popularly known as Patiala Peg. The state of Punjab has the highest alcohol 
consumption figures in contemporary India. From this district, three villages were randomly 
selected that are representative of the district in several dimensions, including alcohol 
consumption. Based on stratified random sampling method, about 150 households were 
randomly selected from these villages.  
    All households in the three villages were first stratified into cultivating and non-cultivating 
households, and then the cultivating households were stratified in terms of marginal farming 
households (less than 2.5 acres); small farming households (2.51 to 5.0 acres), medium farming 
households (5.01 to 10.0 acres) and large farming households (above 10.0 acres). From each 
village, approximately 10 households were randomly selected for each category. Thus, about 
40 households were selected from each village with a total of 120 farm households selected 
from all the three villages. In addition to cultivating households, a total number of 10 landless 
agricultural labour households were also randomly selected from every village. The aggregate 
sample consists of 895 alcohol drinkers and non-drinkers from 150 households surveyed.   
    The survey collected two types of information: (a) Household survey: Survey recorded 
household level information for all the sample households. The head of the household was 
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interviewed to gather detailed item wise monthly information on food and non-food 
consumption, household assets owned, land owned, and information on the demographic 
characteristics of each household members. Monthly expenditures for all the food and non-
food items consumed by all the households were recorded for the past month to arrive at the 
total monthly expenditure. Information on food includes about 33 items including food 
consumed both inside and outside the house, including wages and gifts received. The non-food 
items were of two types with items that are purchased regularly every month (such as 
expenditure on fuel and electricity, products for cleaning and personal care and telephone bills) 
and the other annual (such as clothing and footwear, medicine and health cost, ceremonies, 
education and taxes). 
    (b) Individual survey: The alcohol drinkers were interviewed and closely followed for six 
years, monitoring and recording the type of alcohol consumed, quantity consumed, price paid, 
year started to drink, and reasons for drinking. Similar information was also collected for 
smoking, although its prevalence in general is very low. Two alcohol types are consumed, 
Indian made foreign liquor (IMFL) and country liquor. Although individuals across quartiles 
drink both types of alcohol, drinkers from the bottom quartile largely consume country liquor 
(85 percent) while IMFL are consumed mostly by the top quartile (25 percent). The country 
liquor is manufactured either within the village or just outside using gur as the key ingredient, 
while IMFL are imported from the urban centres. About 83 percent of the alcohol consumed 
across all three villages and quartiles are country liquor and the rest IMFL. We focus our 
analysis on individuals aged 15 years or older because of the presence of strong taboo, so either 
the children do not consume alcohol or they are miss-reported. Since income is often a more 
sensitive topic than consumption in developing countries, we follow Deaton (2000) in using 
household total consumption expenditure as proxy for household income. We combine data 
from both household and individual surveys to derive total consumption expenditure. 
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    The data used in this paper has several advantages compared to previous studies in the 
literature. First, our paper utilizes panel data that allows for controlling of individual 
heterogeneity by estimating individual fixed effect regressions. All data relating to the variables 
come from single source, rigorously collected three times over the six-year period. The 
advantage is that all the information relating to the drinking cohort on consumption and prices 
are implemented using a single coherent methodology. In most studies in the literature key 
variables like alcohol prices, taxes and consumption come from different data sources, 
employing different methodology and are unrelated to consumption cohort, or based on pseudo 
panel data (Nelson, 2013). 
    Second, most studies in this literature are based on family expenditure surveys, collecting 
alcohol data as part of household expenditure that do not indicate individual alcohol 
consumption or discrete alcohol prevalence among household members (McKenzie, 2002). 
The data we use in this paper are individual consumption data that includes gifts and unpaid 
consumption, mainly gathered through in-depth interviews and follow-up surveys with alcohol 
drinkers on the variety, quantity and price of alcohol consumed. The collection of 
comprehensive data following each drinker over several years was made possible only because 
of the thin spatial spread of the chosen villages. However, a compensating advantage of our 
data is the rigorous implementation of in-depth interviews tracing and tracking each drinker 
over several years, highly improbable in large scale surveys. 
    Third, we collected three rounds of data across different months during the years to 
accommodate any seasonality in consumption. Seasonal variations are substantial in many 
regions of the developing countries, reflecting the often-observed tendency for price elasticity 
to be higher for lower-income households (Behrman and Deolaliakar, 1989). The NCAER-
ISEC data collected is long enough panel to accommodate any consumption dynamics cloaked 
in the shorter panels. Majority of alcohol consuming individuals tend to drink every day, more 
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or less the same quantity, but there seem to be some variation across seasons during the year. 
Since consumption is higher during the festival season, we spread the data collection across 
different seasons. In the year 2008, the survey was carried out at the beginning of the 
agricultural season when households are generally impoverished. The next survey in 2011-12 
was implemented in the middle of the season with households having some cash flow. The 
third survey in the year 2013-14 was done at the end of the season when most households have 
no liquidity constraints. There is no sample attrition with all the households and individuals 
appearing across all the years, except three drinkers who died after the second survey, hence 
do not appear in the third survey. See online appendix for details on variable definition. 
2.2. Significance of alcohol consumption  
    The significance of alcohol consumption in total food consumption of the selected 
households is reported in Table 1. Alcohol consumption in all three villages is substantial 
accounting for about 15 percent of the total food expenditure on average and is higher in the 
village of Dhanori. Even among the bottom quartile, a large share of about 14 percent is spent 
on alcohol. However, income shares spent on alcohol reported in Schilbach (2015) are much 
higher at 43 percent in their study among low-income men in the south Indian city of Chennai.   
    More than half of the households in the villages report consuming alcohol with higher 
prevalence (63 percent) in Ajnauda Kalan village. High prevalence is also reported by 
Chowdhury et al. (2006), who study the impact of alcohol use employing ethnographic method 
in six villages in the Indian state of West Bengal. Similarly, Schilbach (2015) report high mean 
prevalence (76 percent) of alcohol consumption among low-income men. Although the 
expenditure on alcohol across quartiles are not very different, a larger percentage of households 
from the top quartile report consuming alcohol compared to the bottom quartile.  
Table 1 
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2.3. Tabulations: food consumption patterns and profile of drinkers 
    Like-for-like comparison of results presented in Table 2 from another large All India sample 
survey, conducted for the same year 2011-12 by the National Sample Survey Organisation (see 
online appendix for details on NSSO) (Government of India, 2011), shows how consumers 
allocate their budgets looking at the disposition of broad categories of expenditures for rural 
Punjab, and how much each food costs. The first two columns show the expenditure shares 
from NSSO and NCAER-ISEC data, respectively. Next the expenditure patterns across bottom 
and top quartiles in Columns 3 and 4 are expressed as shares of the budget from the NCAER-
ISEC data. 
Table 2 
    Column 2 shows that the largest budget shares are for dairy products, fruits and vegetables, 
and alcohol. Similar pattern is also reflected in the NSSO 2011-12 data in Column 1 of Table 
2 for rural Punjab; except that the shares of cereals are higher while fruits and vegetables, and 
alcohol are lower in the NSSO. This is more a reflection that households in the selected villages 
are more prosperous than the average household in the NSSO samples from rural Punjab. The 
household budget going to alcohol consumption in the NCAER-ISEC samples is almost five 
times more than the NSSO estimates. The underestimate of alcohol consumption in the NSSO 
is perhaps a reflection of the limitations of large scale general surveys to capture the 
consumption of goods like alcohol and tobacco.  
    Unit values paid for pulses, dairy, oils and fats, and meat are regressive, while for all other 
consumption items the top quartiles pay higher on average. Since most households in the top 
quartile produce their own food, it is not unlikely that they report a lower unit value. Given that 
part of the output produced in their farm are sold at the farm gate price, these household report 
consumption expenditures evaluated at farm gate prices, which is lower than the retail prices.     
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    Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all key variables separately for drinkers and non-
drinkers. The drinker households seem to be on average older, mostly males with lower 
education levels and come from lower family size. Moreover, they tend to have slightly more 
children and fewer adults within the household and have higher per capita per month 
expenditure. The land owned is lower among drinkers who are mostly self-employed in 
agriculture and belong to Sikh religion, and come from forward caste. Among drinkers, a larger 
percentage are in the bottom quartile (27 percent).  
Table 3 
2.4. Model specification and estimation 
    The model estimated takes the following general form: 
Cit  = 
a β1  Pit
a +  𝛽2  𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡  
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑎 is the consumption of alcohol by individual i at time t and 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 is the price of alcohol 
paid by individual i at time t. Other household and village characteristics (𝑍𝑖𝑡) are included as 
controls. Village fixed effects (𝛿𝑖) are included to control for omitted and time-invariant 
characteristics of villages. We also include year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡) to control for time-varying 
trends. The term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term. Since our focus is on examining the household burden of 
alcohol consumption, we primarily estimate the above equation with budget share of alcohol 
as the dependant variable. Budget share is the ratio of total alcohol expenditure for each 
household to its total household consumption expenditure. However, to examine the robustness 
of the results we also report using quantity of alcohol consumed and expenditure on alcohol as 
dependant variables. For the estimation strategy to address the identification problem, we rely 
on comparison of estimates from OLS to the estimates from the instrumental variable models. 
See online appendix for more details of the different models estimated. 
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2.5. Identification strategy 
    Endogeneity is a serious concern in the above equation when estimating the relationship 
between consumption and price of alcohol, since price is the equilibrium of a system of 
simultaneous equations. Our strategy here in addressing this identification concern is to 
instrument the price of alcohol with one of the input prices, namely, the price of gur. The 
locally brewed alcohol, consumed by most households, requires two major inputs. The first 
input is the gur, an extract of sugarcane imported from outside the village, while water is the 
second input available locally often for free. To identify demand, we use the price of gur as 
instrument that is unlikely to influence demand but strongly affects supply, given that gur is 
the key ingredient in its production. However, apart from gur being used in the production of 
country liquor, it is also consumed directly by the households. Consequently, there could be 
some concerns about the influence on demand for alcohol. The price of gur also affects the 
demand for alcohol through the household budget, apart from affecting the price of alcohol 
directly. Given the small share of gur in the overall food budget (mean share of 1.03 percent) 
and occasionally consumed during festivals, it is unlikely that it will have a big influence on 
the demand for alcohol. More details of the estimation strategy are provided in the online 
appendix. 
3. Results 
3.1. Main findings     
Table 4 presents the elasticities for different models with quantity of alcohol in ml (Columns 
1-4) and budget share of alcohol (Columns 5-8) as dependant variable. For some regressions, 
we present standard errors clustered at the household level and controlling for village and year 
fixed effects. Although, given data collection across different seasons over the years, we are 
able to control for both year and seasonal fixed effects, but unable to distinguish their individual 
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effects. The distinction however is not necessary for our analysis. Column (1) to Column (4) 
confirm the predictions of negative price elasticity in the Becker and Murphy model. Column 
(5), reports regression results for model with additional socio-economic controls but excluding 
fixed effects, shows that a 10 percent increase in the price of alcohol causes a 10 percent 
increase in the budget share of alcohol consumption. This estimate is statistically significant at 
the conventional 1 percent level. The estimates are robust to additional controls (fixed effects) 
and inclusion of clustered standard errors across models in Columns 6 to 8. One potential 
consequence of the significant positive elasticity for the alcohol consuming households is that 
consumption of alcohol could impose a squeeze on the overall household budget, crowding out 
necessities like health and education (Rajaraman 2007; Jumrani and Birthal 2017). 
Table 4 
    The per capita total expenditure across all models for budget share of alcohol are negative 
and statistically significant at 1 percent – increasing incomes raise the cost of inebriation, 
affecting consumption of alcohol negatively. The negative effect on earnings of alcohol 
consumption is likely to be greater when earnings are greater. Similarly, demographic changes 
within the households also have a significantly negative effect on alcohol consumption. The 
increase in non-drinker members within the household through birth or marriage reduces 
alcohol consumption of the existing drinker members. Interestingly, education has a 
significantly negative effect on the budget share of alcohol. 
Table 5 
    Further, we disaggregate the analysis here by separating households per different 
expenditure levels. In Table 5, we present results for the two expenditure categories: bottom 
quartile and top quartile. For convenience, we also present in Column 1, OLS results from a 
variant of the model presented in Table 4 for the full sample. In Columns 3 and 5, OLS results 
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for the bottom quartile and top quartile, respectively are reported. The price elasticity for the 
bottom quartile shows that a 10 percent increase in the price of alcohol increases the budget 
share by 16 percent. Comparatively, the price elasticity for the top quartile is almost half at 9 
percent. Interestingly, results reported for per capita per month expenditure displays income 
elasticity that is statistically significant across all groups. Both bottom and top quartiles tend to 
indulge less in alcohol consumption as income increases.   
3.2. Robustness 
    Using the full sample, we next pursue the robustness of our results using instruments (IV) 
that are reported alternatively in Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 5. Our identification strategy uses 
gur price as an instrument for the price of alcohol. Though comparison of IV elasticities with 
OLS estimates reported for full sample shows marginal difference, estimates reported for the 
bottom quartile shows large difference. In contrast, results reported for the top quartile does 
not show much difference between the estimates. Thus, OLS overestimates the impact of 
alcohol price on the budget share of alcohol for the bottom quartile. We also report F-statistic 
from first stage at the bottom of Table 5, which has a value greater than 10 for all three IV 
models. The null hypothesis of regressor exogeneity is rejected by the Hausman test. The 
instrument thus satisfy both the relevance and the exclusion conditions. 
   One impending concern with the above specifications is the corner solution for a large 
proportion of individuals who do not report alcohol consumption. Since corner solutions do 
not satisfy the first order conditions for an interior optimum of the underlying utility 
maximization problem, the above estimation does not apply to observations with zero 
expenditure on alcohol. Alcohol consumption are thus estimated using tobit regressions, 
whereby observed consumption equal notational or desired consumption when the latter are 
positive, and are zero otherwise. The advantage with tobit regressions is that it uses all 
observations, both those at the limit and those above it (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). 
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However, we are assuming here that all zero expenditures are the result of corner solutions and 
that a sufficiently large change in income or relative prices would create positive expenditures 
for any household. This may seem unrealistic given that many do not consume alcohol even if 
it was for free because of health or social reasons. The results from the tobit model are presented 
in Table 6 along with the results from the IV tobit model. The estimates for the price of alcohol 
reveal that budgetary share of alcohol increases with the increase in its price which is 
significant at 10 percent level. Both household size and years of schooling are individually 
significant but not per capita per month expenditure. For the IV tobit model, the above results 
do not change much except for per capita per month expenditure that becomes significant at 10 
percent level. Since results reported here are not very different from the estimates presented 
previously across different models, we do not show the marginal effects. However, interested 
readers can request these from the authors. 
Table 6 
3.3. Robustness: results from restrictive sample 
We further check the robustness of our results considering the two-year sub-sample. The results 
presented in Table 7 show that price elasticity is significantly positive and much larger than 
previously observed in the full sample. The elasticity from the instrumental variable regression 
is even larger and significant. The results from the tobit model and IV tobit also report 
significantly positive coefficients. In summary, the result presented so far contradicts the 
predictions of the rational addiction model that higher taxes of the addictive goods will be able 
to reduce the burden of alcohol consumption. 
Table 7 
3.4. Sobriety and drinking 
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    Preliminary analysis of the odds that individuals in the drinking population (current alcohol 
drinkers and ex-drinkers) quit is now undertaken. A summary of the descriptive statistics for 
variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 8. About 24 percent of the total drinkers in 
the sample quit drinking. The sober are generally older, have lower years of schooling, come 
from smaller family size, and have less number of children and fewer adults. The per capita 
incomes are somewhat lower but the land and assets owned seem to be higher for the sober. 
Most sober belong to higher caste and a large difference in age and education with the 
household head, and more interestingly, the medical costs seem to be higher for the sober. 
Table 8 
    We next examine the odds-ratios presented in Table 9. Technical details of the estimation 
strategy are presented in the online appendix. The estimates that higher alcohol prices increase 
the odds of quitting alcohol are reflected across all the models. However, none of the estimates 
seem to be significant, showing that price is not a significant determinant of going sober. The 
insignificant effect across most models for years of education supports the view that increases 
in schooling might not result in individuals going sober. The positive and significant 
coefficients for age in some models show that the shadow price of health increases with age as 
does the price of drinking alcohol. 
Table 9 
    From policy point of view, it is interesting to observe that per capita income is a highly 
significant determinant of quitting drinking across all the models. This is in line with another 
proposition in the Becker and Murphy model which suggests that the negative effect on 
earnings of increased alcohol consumption is likely to be greater when earnings are greater. So 
an income policy such as cash transfer programs or employment programs that increases the 
cost of inebriation could be a useful alternative to the price policy. It is important to note that 
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this policy prescription is consistent with both budgetary share of alcohol consumption and 
odds of going sober. 
4. Discussion 
    Our results show that higher alcohol prices increase the budget share of alcohol across all 
households by 10 percent while for the bottom quartile, it increases by 16 percent for a 10 
percent increase in alcohol price. Although, also increasing for the top quartile, the impact of 
alcohol prices on the budget share of alcohol is lower. However, correcting for econometric 
issues using IV method corroborates both the direction and significance level of the estimates, 
but the estimates for the bottom quartile are much lower in comparison to the OLS estimates. 
An increase in alcohol price is associated with higher alcohol budget shares and greater 
household burden defy the predictions of the rational addiction models that considers price 
policy to be welfare-enhancing. This outcome is robust to different econometric specifications. 
    Results reported have wider implications for the effectiveness of minimum alcohol pricing 
policy under consideration in several countries including the developed. An increase in the 
minimum price of alcohol will adversely affect households across all income categories. 
Nevertheless, the bottom quartile will be relatively worse off given higher budget shares and 
lower per unit prices of alcohol. Under budgetary constraints, spending on alcohol has 
enormous opportunity cost because other desirable goods must be forgone (Jumrani and Birthal 
2017).  
    The inelastic nature of the demand for addictive goods impose double burden on the deprived 
households - minimum pricing policy will not only make the poor even poorer but also crowd 
out essential consumption. Prior literature suggests that expenditure on addictive goods will 
reduce expenditures on necessities such as food, health care, education and energy intake (John, 
2008). Can prohibition of alcohol be an important alternative policy to increased tax rates in 
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India? Results presented in Subramanian et al. (2005) and Rehman (2003) suggest that 
prohibition policy have little effect on alcohol use by men in India. Though further research is 
required to understand the effect of cash transfer on alcohol consumption, such income policies 
with the potential to increase the cost of inebriation could be welfare-enhancing for the poor 
households. Finally, we advocate care in generalizing our results given that our samples are 
drawn from fewer villages. 
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Table 1. Significance of alcohol consumption in total food consumption 
  Sample means 
 Total food 
expenditure 
(Rs.) 
Expenditure 
on alcohol 
(Rs.) 
Col.(2) as 
% of Col 
(1) 
% of households 
reporting alcohol 
intake 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full sample 
By village 
      Ajnauda kalan 
      Dhanori 
      Simro 
By income groupings 
      Bottom quartile       
      Top quartile 
9,481 
 
9,941 
8,409 
9,924 
 
9,534 
10,017 
1,396 
 
1,518 
1,554 
1,113 
 
1,360 
1,474 
14.72 
 
15.27 
18.48 
11.22 
 
14.26 
14.71 
57.73 
 
63.16 
53.53 
56.47 
 
44.19 
58.19 
Notes: Table based on household level information. Expenditure is calculated on household 
basis with at least one household member reporting consumption of alcohol and is averaged 
over all appropriate consuming households from the household panel data.  Year specific 
quartiles are applied to the panel for income groupings. 
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Table 2. Food expenditure patterns and unit values, rural Punjab, year 2011-2012 
 Expenditure shares   Unit value in Indian Rupees per 
kilogram/litre/packet 
NSSO mean Mean Bottom quartile Top quartile Mean 
 
Bottom quartile Top quartile 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Cereals 13.26 7.82 9.37 6.80  15.97 15.84 16.07 
Pulses 4.66 4.88 5.62 4.58  72.79 75.81 71.12 
Dairy 36.00 33.08 31.52 34.92  41.69 46.80 38.42 
Oils and fats 6.41 6.01 8.53 4.41  82.05 84.44 80.14 
Meat 1.05 5.17 4.98 4.96  29.38 31.28 17.06 
Fruits and vegetables 12.14 25.78 22.87 27.87  49.23 44.10 52.31 
Sugar 6.81 8.32 9.75 7.41  45.34 41.90 44.73 
Alcohol 2.08 11.62 9.99 12.74  0.27 0.26 0.31 
Smoking 0.66 2.19 2.53 2.37  5.06 5.06 5.91 
Other food 16.93 6.37 7.47 5.86  358.23 371.91 405.32 
 
Notes: (1) The expenditure shares in Column 1 are based on the most recent NSSO 68th round (July 2011 – June 2012). All the other expenditure 
shares in columns 2-4 are from the NCAER-ISEC second survey for the same year with the household averages across each expenditure 
categories. Mean refers to mean over the whole sample but conditional on consumption. Year specific quartiles are applied to the panel for 
income groupings. (2) Unit values in columns 5-7 are averages over consuming households. Unit values for cereals, pulses, meat, fruits and 
vegetables, sugar are for Indian rupees per kilogram. Dairy and oils and fats unit values are for rupees per litre. Since for alcohol and smoking 
individual information on consumption and prices were collected, we report here prices rather than unit values. Mean alcohol prices are Indian 
rupees per millilitre and smoking are rupees per packet. Other food includes processed food, non-alcoholic beverages, cooked food bought from 
outside or received as wages, etc. Most consumption of food items reported in this table for the top quartile is from self-production evaluated at 
farm gate prices. Since unit values of pulses, dairy, oils and fats, and meat for the top quartile are based on farm gate prices they are generally 
lower than the market prices.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: drinkers and non-drinkers 
 All 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log(quantity of alcohol in ml) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log( budget share of alcohol )   
log(price of input gur) 
Age 
Sex(1-male; 0 – otherwise) 
Years of schooling 
Household size 
Number of children 
Number of adult 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
log(land owned in acres) 
log(value of total assets owned) 
Primary occupation – labor  
(1-labor; 0 –otherwise) 
Primary occupation – self employed 
(1- self-employed in farm and non-farm work; 0 –
otherwise) 
Religion (1 – Sikh; 0 – otherwise) 
Caste (1- forward; 0 – otherwise) 
424 
424 
424 
1830 
2335 
2335 
2335 
2335 
2335 
2335 
2335 
1880 
2155 
2335 
 
2335 
 
 
2335 
2335 
7.400 
-1.330 
-3.264 
3.846 
39.618 
0.531 
3.366 
6.580 
1.681 
4.898 
7.967 
1.301 
12.525 
0.095 
 
0.305 
 
 
0.899 
0.717 
1.034 
0.278 
0.925 
0.474 
16.030 
0.499 
1.936 
2.729 
1.324 
1.936 
0.398 
1.050 
1.350 
0.293 
 
0.460 
 
 
0.300 
0.450 
3.912 
-2.120 
-6.478 
3.091 
16 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
6.739 
-1.609 
7.313 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
9.998 
-0.210 
-1.213 
5.298 
95 
1 
8 
16 
6 
12 
9.330 
3.258 
15.297 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
Percentage in bottom quartile 
Percentage in top quartile 
27.06% 
22.91% 
 
 Drinkers 
log(quantity of alcohol in ml) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log( budget share of alcohol )   
log(price of input gur) 
Age 
Sex (1-male; 0 – otherwise) 
Years of schooling 
Household size 
Number of children 
Number of adult 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
log(land owned in acres) 
log(value of total assets owned) 
Primary occupation – labor  
(1-labor; 0 –otherwise) 
Primary occupation – self employed 
(1- self-employed in farm and non-farm work; 0 –
otherwise) 
Religion (1 – Sikh; 0 – otherwise) 
Caste (1- forward; 0 – otherwise) 
424 
424 
424 
544 
544 
544 
544 
544 
544 
544 
544 
426 
482 
544 
 
544 
 
 
544 
544 
7.400 
-1.330 
-3.264 
3.966 
45.308 
0.996 
3.121 
6.329 
1.724 
4.604 
8.012 
1.180 
12.427 
0.237 
 
0.641 
 
 
0.926 
0.676 
1.034 
0.278 
0.925 
0.524 
14.086 
0.060 
1.848 
2.821 
1.316 
2.046 
0.381 
1.095 
1.415 
0.425 
 
0.479 
 
 
0.261 
0.468 
3.912 
-2.120 
-6.478 
3.091 
16 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
6.739 
-1.609 
7.313 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
9.998 
-0.210 
-1.213 
5.298 
95 
1 
8 
16 
6 
12 
9.240 
3.258 
15.297 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
Percentage in bottom quartile 26.65%  
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Notes: Table based on individual level data with sometimes more than two drinkers coming 
from the same household.
Percentage in top quartile 21.87% 
 Non-drinkers 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log( budget share of alcohol )   
log(price of input gur) 
Age 
Sex (1-male; 0 – otherwise) 
Years of schooling 
Household size 
Number of children 
Number of adult 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
log(land owned in acres) 
log(value of total assets owned) 
Primary occupation – labor  
(1-labor; 0 –otherwise) 
Primary occupation – self employed 
(1- self-employed in farm and non-farm work; 0 –
otherwise) 
Religion (1 – Sikh; 0 – otherwise) 
Caste (1- forward; 0 – otherwise) 
0 
0 
1286 
1791 
1791 
1791 
1791 
1791 
1791 
1791 
1454 
1673 
1791 
 
1791 
 
 
1791 
1791 
- 
- 
3.796 
37.890 
0.390 
3.440 
6.656 
1.668 
4.987 
7.953 
1.336 
12.553 
0.0519 
 
0.203 
 
 
0.891 
0.730 
- 
- 
0.442 
16.188 
0.487 
1.956 
2.697 
1.327 
1.893 
0.403 
1.034 
1.330 
0.221 
 
0.402 
 
 
0.311 
0.443 
- 
- 
3.091 
16 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
6.739 
-1.609 
7.313 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
- 
- 
5.298 
90 
1 
8 
16 
6 
12 
9.330 
3.258 
15.297 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
1 
Percentage in bottom quartile 
Percentage in top quartile 
27.20% 
23.24% 
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Table 4. Effect of alcohol prices on its consumption: village-time fixed effect OLS regressions on full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All regressions are based on individual level data. Other socio-economic controls include religion, caste and main occupation of the 
drinker. Robust standard errors reported are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.: log(quantity of alcohol in ml)  log(budget share of alcohol) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
 
log(years of schooling) 
 
log(age) 
 
log(household size) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.594*** 
(0.166) 
0.753*** 
(0.164) 
-0.110 
(0.074) 
0.370* 
(0.196) 
0.496** 
(0.161) 
-1.245 
(1.541) 
-0.597** 
(0.209) 
0.730*** 
(0.166) 
-0.104 
(0.073) 
0.391** 
(0.192) 
0.473** 
(0.172) 
-1.115 
(1.560) 
-0.627** 
(0.203) 
0.799*** 
(0.211) 
-0.110 
(0.078) 
0.363* 
(0.197) 
0.530** 
(0.188) 
-1.618 
(1.990) 
-0.627*** 
(0.166) 
0.773*** 
(0.171) 
-0.112 
(0.072) 
0.373** 
(0.187) 
0.508 
(0.160) 
-1.292 
(1.533) 
 0.982*** 
(0.079) 
-0.618*** 
(0.080) 
-0.078** 
(0.033) 
0.057 
(0.088) 
-0.331*** 
(0.075) 
-2.719** 
(0.718) 
0.987*** 
(0.080) 
-0.606*** 
(0.086) 
-0.078** 
(0.034) 
0.047 
(0.091) 
-0.323*** 
(0.077) 
-2.642*** 
(0.787) 
0.988*** 
(0.067) 
-0.451*** 
(0.106) 
-0.067** 
(0.032) 
0.042 
(0.107) 
-0.233*** 
(0.072) 
-4.194*** 
(0.754) 
1.007*** 
(0.071) 
-0.558*** 
(0.085) 
-0.072** 
(0.032) 
0.058 
(0.097) 
-0.301*** 
(0.064) 
-3.486 
(0.633) 
Other socio-economic controls Yes No Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
 No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 
R2 
424 
0.204 
424 
0.199 
424 
0.214 
424 
0.201 
 424 
0.822 
424 
0.823 
424 
0.838 
424 
0.832 
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Table 5. Effect of alcohol prices on its consumption: IV-OLS regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Regressions control for age, education, household size, number of adults and children, religion, caste, quantity of alcohol consumed, 
number of alcohol users, occupation, year and village fixed effects, and per capita income. Alcohol prices are instrumented with price of the key 
input raw material gur in the production of alcohol. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Dep. Var.: log(budget share of alcohol) Full sample Bottom quartile Top quartile 
 OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
 
Years of schooling 
 
log(age) 
 
log(household size) 
 
Constant 
 
1.021*** 
(0.077) 
-0.545*** 
(0.074) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.039 
(0.087) 
-0.284*** 
(0.073) 
-3.366*** 
(0.698) 
1.193** 
(0.446) 
-0.992*** 
(0.083) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.125 
(0.094) 
-1.015*** 
(0.048) 
0.737 
(1.431) 
1.641** 
(0.542) 
-0.881** 
(0.456) 
-0.202** 
(0.067) 
-0.111 
(0.391) 
-0.786* 
(0.408) 
7.925* 
(4.287) 
0.764** 
(0.390) 
-0.770*** 
(0.162) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.837*** 
(0.179) 
-1.848 
(1.923) 
0.914*** 
(0.061) 
-1.078*** 
(0.054) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.045 
(0.053) 
-1.202** 
(0.369) 
0.289 
(0.421) 
0.901*** 
(0.096) 
-1.067*** 
(0.040) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.075 
(0.077) 
-1.356*** 
(0.405) 
0.213 
(0.346) 
Other socio-economic controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 
R2 
F statistics first stage; (pval) 
Hausman test (pval) 
424 
0.835 
 
424 
0.964 
11.65 (0.000) 
7.15 (0.007) 
128 
0.531 
128 
0.965 
15.70 (0.000) 
3.84 (0.050) 
58 
0.998 
58 
0.998 
15.03 (0.000) 
87.56 (0.000) 
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Table 6. Robustness check: Tobit and IV Tobit models 
 Dependent Variable: budget share of alcohol 
 Random effect Tobit 
model 
IV Tobit model 
 (1) (2) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log(household size) 
 
log(age) 
 
Age square 
 
log(years of schooling) 
 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
 
Constant 
 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.041** 
(0.020) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.075 
(0.102) 
0.204** 
(0.083) 
-0.049*** 
(0 .012) 
0 .034 
(0 .029) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.027** 
(0 .010) 
-0.035* 
(0 .018) 
0.616 
(0.294) 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Observations 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 (pval) 
424 
704.776 
65.49(0.000) 
1357 
 
10.76(0.0010) 
Notes: Alcohol prices are instrumented with price of the key input raw material Gur in the 
production of alcohol. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 7. Robustness check: two years subsample analysis 
 Dependent Variable: budget share of alcohol 
 OLS IV-OLS Random effect Tobit IV Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Elasticity, Price of alcohol 
 
Constant 
 
0.891*** 
(0.017) 
7.491*** 
(1.971) 
2.627* 
(1.542) 
2.998 
(3.383) 
0.651*** 
(0.035) 
0.225 
(0.117) 
0.598* 
(0.342) 
0.152 
(0.186) 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Wald chi2 (pval) 
Log Likelihood 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
155 
0.235 
32.98 (0.001) 
 
155 
0.287 
 
140.474 
1357 
52.91(0.000) 
 
1357 
Note: All regressions are based on individual level data. Models in columns 1 and 3 controls for household size and total expenditure per capita. 
In columns 2 and 4, prices of alcohol is instrumented with the price of gur controlling for household size, total expenditure per capita, age, age 
square and years of schooling. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent 
and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics: sobriety and drinking 
      
 All 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Sober 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log(budget share of alcohol)   
log(age) 
log(years of schooling) 
log(household size) 
log(number of children) 
log(number of adult) 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
log(land owned in acres) 
log(value of total assets owned) 
Caste (1- forward; 0 – otherwise) 
Agedifhead 
Edudifhead 
log(medical cost) 
0 
0 
129 
129 
129 
96 
129 
129 
117 
120 
129 
129 
129 
53 
- 
- 
3.924 
0.852 
1.624 
0.531 
1.346 
8.007 
1.303 
12.730 
0.705 
2.767 
0.806 
7.885 
- 
- 
0.265 
0.726 
0.479 
0.484 
0.443 
0.453 
0.985 
1.118 
0.457 
2.396 
1.463 
2.277 
- 
- 
2.995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.739 
-0.693 
9.615 
0 
-2 
-1 
3.401 
- 
- 
4.317 
2.079 
2.639 
1.791 
2.302 
9.240 
2.890 
15.297 
1 
10 
5 
13.017 
Percentage sober 24% 
 Drinker 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
log(budget share of alcohol)   
log(age) 
log(years of schooling) 
log(household size) 
log(number of children) 
log(number of adult) 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
log(land owned in acres) 
log(value of total assets owned) 
Caste (1- forward; 0 – otherwise) 
Agedifhead 
Edudifhead 
log(medical cost) 
415 
415 
415 
415 
415 
342 
415 
415 
309 
362 
415 
415 
415 
109 
-1.329 
-3.264 
3.714 
0.924 
1.792 
0.656 
1.450 
8.014 
1.133 
12.327 
0.667 
2.469 
0.626 
7.155 
0.281 
0.933 
0.317 
0.726 
0.411 
0.521 
0.466 
0.357 
1.131 
1.489 
0.471 
3.333 
1.433 
2.128 
-2.120 
-6.478 
2.772 
0 
0.693 
0 
0 
7.086 
-1.609 
7.313 
0 
-25 
-3 
3.912 
-0.210 
-1.213 
4.553 
2.079 
2.772 
1.791 
2.484 
9.172 
3.218 
14.946 
1 
22 
5 
11.512 
Percentage drinkers 76%     
Notes: Given that all the sober are males, we exclude sex from this table. Agedifhead and 
Edudifhead is the difference in age and education, respectively between the drinker (sober) 
and the household head. If the drinker is also the household head then we take the difference 
from the “next in command”, who is usually his wife.
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Table 9. Reasons for sober: logit estimates for sobriety 
 Dependent Variable: sober     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
 
log(land owned in acres) 
 
log(years of schooling) 
 
log(age) 
 
log(number of children) 
 
log(number of adult) 
 
log(household size) 
 
Caste 
 
Agedifhead 
 
Edudifhead 
 
log(medical cost) 
 
Constant 
2.321 
(3.220) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144.916** 
(282.665) 
1.051 
(0.427) 
14.012** 
(14.080) 
 
 
1.205 
(0.492) 
0.517 
(0.560) 
 
 
 
 
5.271* 
(5.133) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.270** 
(2.010) 
4.541 
(7.188) 
9.973** 
(9.055) 
 
 
0.561 
(0.218) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.178** 
(0.156) 
 
 
0.780*** 
(0.049) 
4.737*** 
(1.661) 
1.937*** 
(0.361) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
1.365 
(0.782) 
13.596*** 
(11.028) 
 
 
0.853 
(0.478) 
2.266 
(3.056) 
3.003 
(2.144) 
0.552 
(0.331) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.370** 
(6.300) 
1.793 
(0.786) 
16.359** 
(16.464) 
1.611 
(0.781) 
0.895 
(0.576) 
18.272** 
(18.817) 
6.962** 
(6.212) 
0.701 
(0.576) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.940** 
(4.360) 
1.822 
(0.834) 
17.029** 
(17.588) 
0.937 
(0.308) 
0.787 
(0.488) 
20.507** 
(21.559) 
8.945** 
(8.867) 
0.679 
(0.5858) 
 
 
4.932** 
(3.676) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.150** 
(1.300) 
1.967 
(0.935) 
17.311** 
(18.128) 
1.013 
(0.313) 
0.689 
(0.470) 
19.433** 
(21.632) 
9.280** 
(10.068) 
0.885 
(0.746) 
 
 
3.902 
(3.318) 
 
 
1.324* 
(0.207) 
 
 
1.060** 
(1.240) 
2.153 
(1.152) 
11.835* 
(15.119) 
0.956 
(0.320) 
0.520 
(0.555) 
12.128 
(19.450) 
8.341* 
(9.154) 
0.773 
(0.684) 
 
 
5.422** 
(4.241) 
1.068 
(0.104) 
1.310 
(0.213) 
 
 
1.740 
(2.790) 
Year fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Observations 424 424 110 348 261 261 261 261 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable Sober with “0” for an individual being sober, and “1” otherwise. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary information 
Online appendix 
The impact of price policy on demand for alcohol in rural India 
Variable definitions and descriptions 
The NSS consumer expenditure surveys are quinquennial surveys conducted by the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) that is set up to conduct all India surveys by the 
Government of India since the year 1950. The NSSO conducts regular consumer expenditure 
surveys as part of its “rounds”, each round being normally of a year's duration. The surveys are 
conducted through household interviews, using a random sample of households covering all 
the 35 States and Union Territories. The NSS survey that we compare here is based on the data 
from the sixty-sixth round (2009-10) for the rural Punjab. The sample consists of 3118 
households from 196 villages (Government of India, 2011). 
 
Outcome variables 
Budget share of alcohol in total expenditure. Two types of data were collected. (a) Monthly 
expenditures for all the food and non-food items consumed by each household were recorded 
for the past month to arrive at total monthly expenditure. This excluded expenditures on alcohol 
and tobacco. Information on food comprises of about 33 items containing food consumed both 
inside and outside the house, including wages and gifts received. The non-food items were of 
two types with items that are purchased regularly every month (expenditure on fuel and 
electricity, products for cleaning and personal care, telephone bills, etc.) and the other annual 
(clothing and footwear, medicine and health cost, ceremonies, education, taxes, etc.). (b) For 
each household members consuming alcohol and tobacco products, individual specific 
information on quantity consumed and price paid were recorded. These were summed up for 
each household to arrive at the total household expenditure on alcohol and tobacco. Budget 
share of alcohol is the share of total alcohol expenditure for each household to its total 
household expenditure, including expenditure on alcohol and tobacco.   
Price variables 
Price of alcohol. Alcohol prices depend on the type with country liquor priced lower than the 
Indian made foreign liquor (IMFL). Since IMFL is imported from outside the village they are 
highly expensive. Alcohol type specific information were collected for each drinking 
household member separately along with the respective prices paid and quantities consumed. 
There seem to be considerable heterogeneity in prices in both types. Further interrogation of 
the drinkers suggests that the prices varied from seller to seller and their relationship with them.       
Price of Gur. Gur as the key raw material for the production of country liquor is also consumed 
by the households so gur has competing uses. It is mostly consumed by the bottom quartile 
while the top quartile consume the finer version of gur that is sugar. The share of gur in the 
expenditure budget for both top and bottom quartiles are low.    
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Household variables   
Bottom quartile: All the sample households were sorted in ascending order by their per capita 
per month total expenditure and then first 25% of the households were chosen to be in the 
bottom group. Alcoholics in this group consist of 27% of the total alcoholics in the sample. 
Top quartile. Similarly, in the same sorting by ascending order of household per capita per 
month total expenditure the last 25 percent represent the top group. Alcoholics in this group 
consist of 21 percent of the total alcoholics in the sample.   
Per capital per month total expenditure. It includes both food and non-food expenditure for the 
past 30 days for each household in the sample. However, certain in-frequent expenditures for 
some non-food items like expenditures on clothing, medicine and health costs, ceremonies, 
education, taxes paid are collected for the past 12 months. These annual expenditures are 
divided by 12 to calculate monthly expenditures and added to the food expenditure to calculate 
per month total expenditures for each household. This figure for each household is further 
divided by its household size to calculate per capita per month total expenditure.     
Total irrigated land owned in acres. The total area owned by each household is collected with 
areas under irrigation in acres and sources of irrigation. The area owned of irrigated land 
includes land cultivated by him (or her) and land leased out completely/partially.  
Total unirrigated land owned in acres. The total area owned by each household was also 
collected for unirrigated land but almost no area under this category exists in these villages.    
Present value of total assets owned. All the assets owned by the households are listed along 
with the current value of all the assets owned considering its vintage.   
Household size. This includes all individuals living under one roof and eating from the same 
kitchen. This does not exclude servants and guests living on a permanent basis. 
Number of children. Total number of all individuals within the household below the age of 18 
living under one roof and eating from the same kitchen.  
Number of adults. Number of all individuals within the household over the age of 18 living 
under one roof and eating from the same kitchen.  
Individual variables 
Age. Number of years since birth for each individual within the household.  
Sex. The sex of each individual either male or female is recorded with the code male = 1 and 
female = 0.  
Occupation. The main occupation has 9 categories with self-employed farming, self-employed 
non-farming, salary, pensioner, agricultural wages, non-agricultural wages, dependent, 
household work, and student. This is determined by asking the households for the main (larges) 
source of income.  
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Education. There are 8 educational categories with illiterate, below primary, primary, middle, 
Secondary, technical, graduate and post graduate and above. 
Estimation strategy 
Our basic strategy is to regress consumption of alcohol on a vector of market prices, household 
size and per capita total expenditures. Using a panel of individual consumption, we also split 
the sample by whether a household is in bottom quartile or top quartile, and estimate the 
regression separately for each expenditure categories. We estimate  
Cit  = 
a β1  Pit
a +  𝛽2  𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡  
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑎 is the consumption of alcohol by individual i at time t and 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 is the price of alcohol 
paid by individual i at time t. We estimate three variants of  𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑎  (a) monthly quantity in 
millilitres of alcohol consumed (b) monthly expenditure share of alcohol in total expenditure 
(share measure) (c) monthly expenditure on alcohol in rupees. Other household and village 
characteristics (𝑍𝑖𝑡) are included as control. Village fixed effects (𝛿𝑖) are included to control 
for omitted and time-invariant characteristics of villages. We also include year fixed effects 
(𝛿𝑡) to control for time-varying trends. The term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
Using the full sample, we next pursue the robustness of the results with alternative 
specifications including the instrumental-variables (IV-2SLS).            
Robustness checks 
IV- 2SLS regressions 
Our identification strategy uses gur price as an instrument for the price of alcohol. The price of 
gur is a good instrument because gur is a key determinant of alcohol supply with no direct 
implications for demand. Below, we show that gur price is a significant determinant of the 
alcohol price. Our first-stage equation models the relationship between gur price and alcohol 
price:  
Pit  = 
a 𝑎1𝑖 + D1 Pit
g
+  𝐷2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
In the above equation, gur price (Pit
g
) is the household specific price associated with the 
individual member i used to instrument alcohol price (Pit 
a ) paid by individual i in year t. Here 
𝑎1𝑖 is village fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of household and individual control variables and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
is the error term. 
Cit  = 
a ∝1𝑖 + β1  Pit
a +  𝛽2  𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖𝑡 
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The second-stage equation estimates the elasticity of alcohol price (β1) by regressing the 
predicted price of alcohol from the first stage on budget share of alcohol (Cit 
a ) along with 
individual and household controls. Year and village fixed effects are included along with the 
error term 𝜔𝑖𝑡. 
Tobit models 
One impending concern with the above specifications is the corner solution for a large 
proportion of individuals, with approximately only 11 percent of sample households reporting 
positive alcohol consumption. Since corner solutions do not satisfy the first order conditions 
for an interior optimum of the underlying utility maximization problem, the above estimation 
does not apply to observations with zero expenditure on alcohol. Alcohol consumption are thus 
estimated using tobit regressions, whereby observed consumption equal notational or desired 
consumption when the latter are positive, and are zero otherwise (McDonald and Moffitt, 
1980). 
Given that data on demand for alcohol often have values clustered at zero, Tobit technique uses 
all observations, both those at the limit and those above it. The following model is specified as 
an unobserved latent variable y*: 
𝑦∗ =  𝑋𝑖β +  ∅𝑖          𝑖𝑓  𝑋𝑖β +  ∅𝑖 > 0 
      =  0                         𝑖𝑓  𝑋𝑖β + ∅𝑖 ≤ 0 
where i = 1, 2, …..N, and Xi is a vector of independent variables, and ∅𝑖 an independently 
distributed error term assumed to be normal with zero mean and constant variance σ2. The 
above equation is estimated using maximum likelihood estimator. 
Logit model 
To fix ideas, consider the following regression model: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑎 = ∅1 + ∅2𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 +  ∅3𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where  𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑎  = 0 for individual i being sober and 1 otherwise. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 is the price of alcohol and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 
are other socio-economic controls included in the regression. 
The logistic model has the form 
Logit(S) = In (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) = ∅1 + ∅2𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 +  ∅3𝑍𝑖𝑡 
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Therefore, 
= Probability (S = outcome of interest | 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡,  𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡) 
= 
𝑒∅1+∅2𝑝𝑖𝑡+ ∅3𝑧𝑖𝑡
1+𝑒∅1+∅2𝑝𝑖𝑡+ ∅3𝑧𝑖𝑡
 , 
where  is once again the probability of the event,  ∅1 is the intercept, and ∅2 and ∅3 are 
regression coefficients that are typically estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
Now  / (1-) is simply the odds ratio in favour of going sober – the ratio of the probability 
that the individual will quit alcohol consumption to the probability that he will not quit 
drinking.  
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Table S1: Effect of alcohol prices on its consumption: First stage regressions 
 
Note: Regressions control for age, education, household size, number of adults and children, 
religion, caste, quantity of alcohol consumed, number of alcohol users, occupation and per 
capita income. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  
IV First stage 
Dep. Var.: log(budget share of alcohol) Full Sample Bottom quartile Top quartile 
(1) (2) (3) 
log(Price of input gur)  
 
Constant 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
-2.813*** 
(0.410) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
-3.432*** 
(0.769) 
0.717** 
(0.358) 
-5.638 
(3.508) 
Other socio-economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observation 
R2 
F statistics first stage; (pval) 
424 
0.192 
11.65 (0.000) 
128 
0.552 
15.70 (0.000) 
58 
0.559 
15.03 (0.000) 
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Table S2: Effect of alcohol prices on alcohol expenditure: village-time fixed effect OLS on full 
sample 
  Notes: All regressions are based on individual level data. Other socio-economic controls 
include religion, caste and main occupation of the drinker. Robust standard errors are reported 
are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Reference 
Government of India (2011) “Household consumer expenditure across socio-economic 
groups” NSS Report No. 544, National Sample Survey Organization, Ministry of Statistics 
& Programme Implementation, New Delhi, India. 
McDonald J, Moffitt R., (1980). The uses of Tobit analysis. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics. 62(2): 318-321. 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.: log(expenditure on alcohol) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(alcohol price per ml) 
 
log(per capita per month expenditure in Rs.) 
 
log(years of schooling) 
 
log(age) 
 
log(household size) 
 
Constant 
 
0.367** 
(0.166) 
0.804*** 
(0.164) 
-0.110 
(0.075) 
0.259 
(0.196) 
0.502** 
(0.162) 
-1.202 
(1.542) 
0.362* 
(0.213) 
0.779*** 
(0.167) 
-0.100 
(0.072) 
0.302 
(0.194) 
0.472** 
(0.171) 
-1.206 
(1.569) 
0.336* 
(0.207) 
0.864*** 
(0.213) 
-0.110 
(0.077) 
0.254 
(0.200) 
0.541** 
(0.188) 
-1.690 
(1.988) 
0.333** 
(0.166) 
0.831*** 
(0.171) 
-0.107 
(0.072) 
0.286 
(0.188) 
0.510** 
(0.160) 
-0.107 
(0.072) 
Other socio-economic controls Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effects 
Village fixed effects 
Clustered SE 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Observations 
R2 
424 
0.175 
424 
0.167 
424 
0.183 
424 
0.171 
